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Success under pressure 
Tactics and quantitative thinking 
by CAPT Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. USN (Ret.) 
E eryone wants to know the implications of a smaller defense budget, especially when there is no evidence of fewer naval operations around the world You can get an inkling of my 
views on the tactical consequences of the joint littoral warfare environ-
ment from the article, "Joint Tactics" by LT Jon Walman (SWM Sep/ 
Oct 93:8). But before expanding on that perspective, I want to remind 
you in this article that tactics and numbers are inseparable. 
Thinking with numbers 
One of the bad effects of systems 
analysis - which is quantitative reason-
ing (m Washington) aboutprocurement 
- is that it creates an impression that 
quantitative thinking is only for analysts 
and not for tacticians. My former boss, 
Undersecretmy James Woolsey {now 
Director of Central Intelligence) once 
gave a speech deriding "quantitative 
policy analysis." One ofourtinest CNOs, 
ADM Tom Hayward {who, by the way, 
did a lot to regenerate enthusiasm for 
better tactics) was also critical of the 
"analysts.,, 
Bothofthem thoughttoomuchpower 
bad been surrendered to the "Green Eye 
Shades" in arriving at force-level deci-
sions. Each bad held posts right in the 
middle of the process and knew of what 
he spoke. That old Washington per-
spective is an evil legacy of what I con-
sider to be one of our least effective 
Secretaries of Defense, Robert 
McNamara, because it still soaks up 
most of our analytical talent in over-
blown efforts to rationalize more or bet-
ter hardware. 
By contrast, quantitative thinking 
about tactics was well appreciated and 
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done by naval officers long before Op-
erations Analysis was invented in World 
War Il. In fact, for planning and con-
ducting operations at sea, quantitative 
thinking was more prevalent at the be-
ginning ofthis century than it is now. To 
see this, al] one has to do is scan the 
Naval Institute Proceedings from, say, 
1900 to 1914. Tactics without nwnbers 
is like poker without chips. You cannot 
think, you cannot operate, you cannot 
fight without knowing numerical rela-
tionships. 
At the simplest level, most of you 
understand the basics ofhow far you can 
steam, how much and how fast you can 
deliver ordnance, and how often you 
must replenish. At a higher level, I 
would expect you to know realistic de-
tection ranges, reaction times and hit 
probabilities on ordnance delivered at a 
given target 
At still a higher level of sophistica-
tion, you may have learned how to use 
numbers to take action quickly, as in 
maneuvering to a new station. I've often 
said the maneuvering board was the best 
aid to decision-making ever invented, 
andanactofgenius. To understand why, 
you have to look at books on "tactics" 
written 100 years ago. Until the maneu-
vering board came along, an OOD, or 
captain, or even fleet commander, had 
either to solve a trigonometry problem 
on the spot or use his seaman's eye 
augmented byafewrules of thumb, such 
as steady bearing means collision course. 
In practice, it was al] seaman's eye. 
Art and science 
or seamanship 
Great as it is, a maneuvering board 
alone is a mere piece of paper. For it to 
be useful, you have to go through a two-
step learning process. First, you go to 
school - quite a few hours of it and not 
much fun - to learn to lay down precise 
lines and calculate exact times {the 
instructor'snot-so-well-keptsecretwas 
that precise answers made for triwnphal 
grading). 
Next, you apply what you've teamed 
at sea. The perspective at sea need only 
be roughly correct: speedy solutions 
matter more than precision. The OOD 
and the captain have to know quicker 
eventhanArleighBurkc's "10 seconds" 
which way to turn and an approximate 
course to station. You can refine the 
answer in the turn and monitor your 
movement along the track with fine-
tuning adjustments. You alsosoonleam 
thattheschoothousesolutionisn'tgoing 
to be exact even after you calculate ad-
vance and transfer. Knowing the offset 
and when to tum and slow is a skill that 
has to be developed and honed at sea. 
That, in a nutshell, is the true skill of 
tactical thinking with nwnbers. First. it 
takes hard work and discipline to learn 
quantitative relationships, like trigo-
nometry, worked out by mathematical 
geniuses or fleet-oriented operations 
(? 
Quantitative thinkiog under fire calls on the bJghest skill of a naval leader. 
analysts, who have plenty of time to 
workouttherightanswer. That's called 
numerical science. Second, those basic 
skills have to be honed in the pressure-
cooker environment of warships at sea 
so that their application is as natural 
and practical as possible. That's called 
numerical art. 
Now here's the point Because of 
computerpowerandsomepretty sophis-
ticated tactical decision-aids, there's a 
danger of slacking off in quantitative 
thinking. Knowing is important, but 
thinking under pressure is the challenge. 
Quantitative thinking under fire is the 
highest tactical skill of a naval leader. 
Every generation has new quantities 
to deal with. Once it was the angle and 
pull of the sails. Today the problems in 
~rnanship and war-fighting are differ-
ent, but you can't do quantitative think-
ing as art without hard work, in the 
classroom and at sea. Every decision 
aid, from maneuvering board to Aegis 
fire-control system, is, on one hand, a 
scientific device of great power, but on 
the other hand, useless except in the 
hands of a skilled artist of war. 
Quantitative tactics for real opera-
tions takes streamlined, compact, ab-
breviated thinking, full of short cuts. 
The three-minute and radian rules are 
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good examples that become second na-
ture. Talking tactics is talking about 
numbers and numerical relationships 
between moving objects, like ship and 
guide, ship and target, or ship and in-
coming missile. 
Station keeping 
Formation design comes from quan-
titative thinking. When I was an 00D 
there were formations for every tactical 
situation. They were the fruits, still 
sweet in the 1950s, oflessons learned in 
World War II. Stations used to be kept 
with respect to the guide with almost 
absurd rigor. A formation could be 
quicklysignalledand,becauseshipswere 
within a few thousand yards of each 
other, quickly executed. Formations 
were based on radar and sonar detection 
ranges. The unifying principle behind 
those now-obsolete formations was mu-
tual support: protect your neighbor 
while he protects you. The formations 
are dated but the principle of mutual 
support is immutable. 
Modem fleets are often in disposi-
tions with many miles of separation. A 
set of Fighting Instructions issued by 
the legendary British ADM Nelson 
contained what was then a radical no-
tion: "The order of sailing will be the 
order of battle," so that all ships could 
close and attack the instant the enemy 
came into sight Today the order of 
sailing - the existing formation - in-
herently dictates the order of battle, 
because when the battle begins there 
will be no time to change it. 
The "haystack formation" and its 
many variations made sense in the 1960s 
and 1970s when countertargeting (cre-
ating needles in a haystack) was both 
possible and badly needed against mas-
sive air attacks. Liberal freedom to 
maneuver to accomplish a variety of 
tasks also made sense in Vietnam when 
no attack at sea was likely. Think about 
the current situation and its effect on 
stations and station-keeping. Forma-
tions are at the heart of good tactics, and 
they are created from quantitative think-
ing. 
I'd like to conclude by asking some 
questions intended to stimulate some 
wardroom thought about formations, 
along these lines: 
• As the U.S. Navy moves back to the 
littorals, won't our formations have to 
be tightened up? Argue yow-case for or 
against the need for mutual support 
inshore. 
•Since GPS now gives us the ability 
to keep station more precisely, to what 
extfuit should stations be signalled and 
maintained today as opposed to 10 or 
20 years ago? 
•What do you know about fratricide 
- accidentally killing friendly forces? 
Why and how often does it occur, and 
howcan wereducetheriskof;thappen-
ing? 
CAPT Hughes is a regular contribu-
tor to SWM and is professor of opera-
tions research at the Naval Postgradu-
ate School in Monterey, Calif. His 
article is the second in a series on sur-
face warfare tactics. 
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